TELEGRAM Degartment of State OFFICIAL USE ONLY Classification :-ACTION: CIRCULAR PRIORITY OF SOLE ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS SS Following summary based on background briefing for American SP. newsmen under rules which forbade quotation or attribution to the H Department of State. It may be helpful for backgrounding local SAL officials or newsmen. Summary follows: AF **ARA** Department officials Sunday welcomed Khrushchev message but EUR FE : noted it does not mean all problems solved. President welcomed NEA 10 message as constructive step towards peace. But Soviet intentions DAC are not yet clear, and Cubans may still play important role. Castro USIA SCA hinted in broadcast today he might throw Guantanamo into discussion. NSC Problems of verification, UN supervision, and inspection remain. INR Our reaction positive, but much remains to be done in translating NSA OSD Khrushchev's words into action. Assurances on withdrawal and ARMY NAVY inspection are utterly fundamental. AIR President's reply to Khrushchev's October 26 message states NIC basis for settlement. Other side concerned about invasion of RMR DESCRIPTION OF STREET Cuba. DATE REVISION NO. DETERMINEY IN PART f to Marene pensivo info. And cuthority to P - Robert Manning P:FASieverts:ls 10/28/62 S/S -Mrs. Davigill REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UN'ESS "UNCLASSIFIED". official use our Classification

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of Cuba. It was presence of offensive weapons that precipitated that problem. Does not mean general security arrangements in Hemisphere under Rio Pact are changed. Problem of indirect aggression remains. Cuba not given right to intervene in internal affairs of other American states.

Our reply to Khrushchev's October 26 letter also means there are Turkey no deals (e.g. Bedin, Turkey). No such suspicion should undermine our position in other parts of the world. Purpose of answering Khrushchev's October 26 letter instead of October 27 broadcas. Seech was to proceed on assumption that this approach was the real approach.

This crisis as grave for Soviets as for us. Khrt chev knew we utterly determined to get offensive weapons out of Cuba. What he gets out of it is no war. Also that we go along with his thesis that he's withdrawing missiles in exchange for commitment not to invade Cuba. If make he's willing to/make that trade, if that's what he needs at this point, let's let him have that. Both are important to him. He knows occasion for invasion as far as we concerned was introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba. His intelligence good enough to make clear to him and this how close to the wire we got. Situation was perilous,/andthis is no time to gloat.

Settlement of Cuba crisis along indicated lines pro: .es
guarded
some cause for very seconded optimism that Soviets may be E re f. thcoming
in other areas. Reluctant to state this before Cuban situation cally

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pirmed down. And would be misleading to apply specific events of Cubm crisis to other world problems. Acceptance of inspection in Cubm does not mean Soviets will accept inspection for arms control or test ban. Settlement in Cubm does not mean there will be no Berlin crisis.

Cube crisis underlines need for serious, practical disargament

measures. In this framework main question is military confrontation in Europe. We prepared to make serious arms reduction on both sides.

President emphasized this problem when he alluded to possible detente between NATO and Warsaw Pact. Inspection still the issue. Remains to

be seen if Soviets will be more forthcoming.

Should be noted that inspection of dismantling of offensive weapons in C u im not difficult. Nost anyone can tell if sites actually being dismantled. Doesn't require nuclear physicist. Dismantling not limited to missiles but to sempons described as offensive — which defined in Expansion quarantine order, and includes bombers. Question of Soviet personnel not at issue apart from offensive weapons.

Time limits on dismantling will be developed in UN talks. If snags develop we right back where we started. Very very short time periods involved. Sovietships will be permitted through the quarantime to remove weapons from Cuba. Next step in negotiations involves U Thant and KME Kuznetsov. Kany details must be settled. Coordinating

END